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FINANCIAL  ASSURANCE  FOR  HARDROCK  MINING:
EPA  AND  CERCLA
Braden Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
Precious metals mining, as well as the broader industry of hardrock min-
ing, has changed greatly since Adam Smith posited:
Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring
bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there
is none perhaps more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and
gold mines. . . . They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a
prudent lawgiver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, would
least choose to give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn toward
them a greater share of that capital than what would go to them of its own
accord.1
In short, hardrock mining has become one of the “basic building blocks of a
modern society.”2  The uses of hardrock minerals, including gold and silver,
have expanded with industrialization: modern applications range from
healthcare to transportation, electronics to defense.  Concurrently, improve-
ments in mining technology have greatly increased the efficiency of explora-
tion and the yield of minerals.3  To accommodate the growth of the industry,
the United States shirked the role of Smith’s “prudent lawgiver”; instead, it
gave “extraordinary encouragement” to hardrock mining through the Gen-
eral Mining Act of 1872, a law that authorized hardrock mining on federal
lands and enabled the acquisition of title to such lands while requiring no
royalties and no reclamation, and a law that still governs nearly 150 years
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Science in
Chemical Engineering, Montana State University, 2017.  I am indebted to Professors Bruce
Huber and John Nagle for providing valuable comments, guidance, and encouragement.  I
am also grateful to Nicholas Marshall, whose scrupulous review of an earlier draft greatly
improved this piece.  I would like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their meticulous editing.  Finally, I would like to thank my family and Annie for their
endless support and love.  All errors are, of course, my own.
1 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, at 306–07 (P.F. Collier & Son 1902)
(1776).  The first sentence of this quotation appears in DAVID GERARD, THE MINING LAW OF
1872: DIGGING A LITTLE DEEPER (1997).
2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S NATIONAL HARDROCK MINING FRAMEWORK 1
(1997).
3 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HARDROCK MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 32 (1999).
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later.4  But this accommodation aided in the settlement of the West and the
development of an important sector of the economies of several states and
the nation.5  In the past half century, however, accommodation has given way
to a tightening regulatory atmosphere as a new body of laws has emerged to
ensure greater environmental protection.
On the other hand, certain aspects of hardrock mining have remained
the same.  Capital expenditures continue to be significant, and the globaliza-
tion of the hardrock minerals market6 has not been reversed.7  Both of these
factors, as well as low profit margins, contribute to a volatile industry in which
uncertainty persists; thus, bankruptcy is still brought upon operators with
troubling frequency.8  These bankruptcies are particularly troubling because
the search for hardrock minerals has proven “ruinous” in another sense—it
results in environmental degradation and creates hazardous conditions—and
when operators halt protective procedures and fail to perform reclamation,
the exorbitant but necessary costs of mitigating the harm done must be
borne by someone else.
Operators are required to perform reclamation activities, primarily as a
matter of state law.  To ensure funds will be available to perform reclamation
in the event an operator defaults on its obligations and declares bankruptcy,
financial assurance requirements have emerged.  Apart from limited federal
regulations (which govern only federal lands), state laws and regulations
comprise the universe of financial assurance requirements.  In several cases,
existing requirements have proven grossly insufficient, and taxpayers have
been forced to bear cleanup costs.  Many congressional bills have emerged in
the past three decades to establish comprehensive federal legislation for har-
drock mining and explicitly authorize financial assurance requirements, but
each has failed to become law.  However, section 108(b) of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
contains a provision mandating the promulgation of financial assurance
requirements for “classes of facilities” involved in “the production, transpor-
4 See infra Section I.A.
5 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 1.
6 See 1 SMITH, supra note 1, bk. 1, at 259 (“[The market for coarse and precious met-
als] is not confined to the countries in the neighborhood of the mine, but extends to the
whole world. . . . [T]he productions of the most distant metallic mines frequently may
[be], and in fact commonly are [brought into competition with one another].  The price,
therefore, of the coarse, and still more that of the precious metals, at the most fertile mines
in the world, must necessarily more or less affect their price at every other in it.”); see also
id. at 78–79 (“The discovery of the abundant mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth
century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been before.
As it costs less labor to bring those metals from the mine to the market, so when they were
brought thither they could purchase or command less labor; and this revolution in their
value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means the only one of which history gives
some account.”).
7 See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 103–19 and accompanying text.
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tation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances,”9 though the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible for doing so,
has yet to issue regulations pursuant to this provision and recently declined
to issue regulations it had proposed.10
This Note argues that section 108(b) imposes a mandatory duty on EPA
to require financial assurances from hardrock mining operators and then
seeks to outline the scope of that duty.  Part I provides a brief overview of
hardrock mining, the General Mining Act of 1872, and existing financial
assurance requirements.  Part II turns to section 108(b) of CERCLA and
examines EPA’s inaction under that provision, as well as EPA’s recent deci-
sion not to adopt regulations it had proposed.  Part III then examines the
scope of EPA’s authority under section 108(b) and the federalism implica-
tions thereof.
I. HARDROCK MINING AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
Hardrock mining, as defined by EPA, is “the extraction, beneficiation or
processing of metals (e.g., copper, gold, iron, lead, magnesium, molybde-
num, silver, uranium, and zinc) and nonmetallic, nonfuel minerals (e.g.,
asbestos, gypsum, phosphate rock, and sulfur).”11  Because this list is expan-
sive, it is helpful to note what hardrock mining does not include—among
other things, coal and “leasable minerals” (e.g., oil and gas), which have
received more comprehensive legal treatment.12  Hardrock minerals are
used in a multitude of industries, including transportation, electronics, con-
struction, aerospace, agriculture, health care, and jewelry.13  Despite the
wide range of uses of hardrock minerals, the mining industry itself is “notori-
ously volatile” because prices “fluctuate with world commodity prices” to a
9 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b) (2012).
10 See Financial Responsibility Requirements Under CERCLA Section 108(b) for Clas-
ses of Facilities in the Hardrock Mining Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 7556, 7568 (Feb. 21, 2018)
[hereinafter EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision].
11 Identification of Priority Classes of Facilities for Development of CERCLA Section
108(b) Financial Responsibility Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,213, 37,214 (July 28, 2009)
[hereinafter EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice].
12 See 5 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 173.01
(2d ed., LexisNexis 2018).
13 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, app. at A-1; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-849R, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON STATE ROYALTIES AND TRENDS
IN MINERAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 2 (2008).
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great degree.14  Additionally, the industry is characterized by large capital
expenditures and low profit margins.15
Hardrock mining is most common in twelve western states: Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.16  Mining played a major role in the
settlement of this region, as the promise of work and the prospect of riches
drew millions to the West in the nineteenth century.  To further spur this
burgeoning industry, Congress passed the General Mining Act of 1872, which
opened up federal lands, ninety-two percent of which are found in these
twelve states,17 to mining.18  As such, many hardrock mines have been
located, at least in part, on federal lands.19  Most of the federal lands are
managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS) and the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).20
The life cycle of activities at a given mine can be broadly divided into
four phases: exploration, development, production, and reclamation.21
Exploration is the process by which prospectors seek to locate a mineral
deposit.22  Once they find a deposit and obtain the necessary permits, they
prepare the site for extraction in the development phase; this entails estab-
lishing infrastructure, marking locations for extracting ore and depositing
wastes, and gaining access to the deposit through excavation and, for deep
deposits, the construction of shafts.23  Production is the phase during which
14 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 459 (2005);
see Financial Responsibility Requirements Under CERCLA § 108(b) for Classes of Facilities
in the Hardrock Mining Industry, 82 Fed. Reg. 3388, 3433–34 (Jan. 11, 2017) [hereinafter
EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal] (noting the “frequent fluctuations in commodity
prices within the hardrock mining industry” and the “close linkage between the hardrock
mining industry and global commodity prices”).
15 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3435; DIAMOND, supra note
14, at 459 (“[W]hile some mining companies are more profitable than other mining com-
panies, the industry as a whole operates at such low profit margins that its average rate of
return over the last 25 years hasn’t even met the cost of its capital.”).
16 See John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of Federal Enforcement
and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 804, 804 n.31 (2004); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EPA CAN DO MORE TO HELP MINIMIZE HARDROCK MINING LIABILITIES
1 (1997).
17 See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 21 tbl.5 (2017).
18 See infra Section I.A.
19 See Seymour, supra note 16, at 804.
20 These two agencies account for over seventy percent of federal lands, and the twelve
western states contain over ninety-nine percent of BLM lands and eighty-four percent of
USFS lands. VINCENT ET AL., supra note 17, at 21 tbl.5.
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-165, HARDROCK MINING: BLM AND FOR-
EST SERVICE HAVE TAKEN SOME ACTIONS TO EXPEDITE THE MINE PLAN REVIEW PROCESS BUT
COULD DO MORE 6 (2016); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 23 (dividing
operations into “exploration, mine development, mining (extraction), mineral processing
(beneficiation), and reclamation (for closure)”).
22 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 23.
23 See id. at 25.
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the valuable minerals are recovered and encompasses several activities,
including extraction, beneficiation, and processing.  Extraction, as its name
suggests, is the process by which miners obtain the ores.24  Because the
extracted ores are impure (i.e., they contain materials in addition to the valu-
able mineral), it is necessary to concentrate the valuable mineral by separat-
ing waste minerals; this phase involves beneficiation and processing, two
distinct but related processes.25  Finally, once mining operations cease, the
last step is to close the mine and prepare the land for future uses.  Ideally,
the owner or operator will engage in reclamation to repair the land, mitigate
the environmental damage, and eliminate any health hazards.26  But as we
shall see, abandonment has been widespread, thereby shifting the burden-
some costs of reclamation to another party—often the taxpayer.
Generally speaking, the greatest environmental issues arise during the
production phase.27  One issue relates to mine tailings, the waste minerals
separated from the valuable minerals.28  The harms associated with tailings
first gained national attention in the nineteenth century with the advent of
hydraulic mining.29  Tailings may contain a variety of substances, such as
metals, and are often stored in tailings ponds to avoid the contamination of
groundwater and soil, though leaks in tailings ponds have necessitated
response actions.30  Another problem relates to the chemicals used in a par-
ticular beneficiation technique called leaching, which uses solvents to sepa-
rate the valuable minerals.31  One common solvent is sodium cyanide, which
can leach gold and silver from low-grade ores.32  While it is an effective
24 See EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,215; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 3, at 25.
25 Beneficiation involves separating the valuable mineral from the waste minerals,
while processing involves extracting the valuable mineral from the concentrated solution.
See EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,215; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 3, at 26.
26 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 27.
27 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16, at 3–4; see also DIAMOND, supra
note 14, at 452–53 (“The environmental problems caused by hardrock mining are of sev-
eral types.  One involves disturbance of land surface by digging it up [i.e., the development
phase]. . . . Further environmental problems caused by hardrock mining involve water
pollution by metals themselves, processing chemicals, acid drainage, and sediment. . . .
The remaining environmental problem concerns where to dump all the dirt and wastes
dug up in the course of mining . . . .”).
28 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 26; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 16, at 3.
29 For a detailed account of the rise of hydraulic mining and the controversy that
ensued in California concerning mining debris, see ROBERT L. KELLEY, GOLD VS. GRAIN:
THE HYDRAULIC MINING CONTROVERSY IN CALIFORNIA’S SACRAMENTO VALLEY (1959).
30 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3458, 3471.
31 See EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,215; DIAMOND, supra note 14, at
453; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 28.
32 See EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,215; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 3, at 26.
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chemical, cyanide is a harmful contaminant,33 and failures to contain it have
required major environmental cleanups costing hundreds of millions of
dollars.34
There has never been a federal act comprehensively addressing har-
drock mining and its impacts, but states, in response to environmental con-
cerns, have filled this void to some extent by adopting regulatory schemes.35
Beginning with Alaska in 1963, and followed by several other western states in
the 1970s, states began to require reclamation plans prior to operations,
regardless of land ownership.36  These reclamation plans impose obligations
on the operators in an effort to mitigate the environmental impacts of har-
drock mining.  With reclamation requirements came financial assurance
requirements,37 which seek to insure against the risk that a company will
default on its obligation to perform reclamation and thereby shift the
expense of reclamation to the public.  The following Sections discuss the
existing framework for hardrock mining activities with a focus on reclama-
tion and financial assurance obligations.
A. General Mining Act of 1872
During the nineteenth century, the federal government acquired a vast
area of land and subsequently sought to dispose of it.38  The different mecha-
nisms of disposal represented different goals—chiefly, encouraging develop-
ment and providing money for the government.  Congress opted for the
former when it enacted the General Mining Act of 1872,39 which aimed to
promote mineral exploration and development and help settle the West.40
The General Mining Act of 1872 declared mineral deposits on federal lands
“free and open to exploration” and provided a mechanism by which parties
could patent a claim (i.e., acquire title to the land).41
The law remains in effect, and its resilience, in the eyes of its critics, has
been problematic.  Environmentalists and fiscal conservatives alike have criti-
cized the law for several reasons42 and urged reform thereto.43  One funda-
33 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3473.
34 See infra Part II.
35 See JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 213 (1987).
36 See JAMES R. KUIPERS, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, HARDROCK RECLAMATION BONDING
PRACTICES IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES, at I-2 tbl.1.1.1, I-3 tbl.1.1.2 (2000).
37 See id.
38 In the Louisiana Purchase alone, the United States acquired about 530,000,000
acres. Louisiana Purchase, 1803, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/
1801-1829/louisiana-purchase (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
39 General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 30 U.S.C.).
40 See MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33908, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS:
HARDROCK MINERALS 1 (2008).
41 30 U.S.C. § 22.
42 See, e.g., GERARD, supra note 1, at 1–3 (discussing criticisms such as “the low cost of
acquiring title to land and the absence of royalties paid to the government” and that the
“system subsidizes exploration, inappropriately limits the role of the government in
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mental criticism is that the law lacks environmental protection provisions,44
which is perhaps unsurprising given that it preceded the modern environ-
mental movement by a century.45  Since its enactment, the tide of public
opinion has shifted dramatically toward protecting the environment, as well
as preserving public lands (which, at a minimum, cuts against private disposi-
tion of federal lands).  But for several reasons, the General Mining Act has
remained largely intact46 for nearly a century and a half despite calls for
reform, leading one scholar to call it “one of the most durable perpetual
motion machines ever assembled.”47
Congress has shown interest in reforming the General Mining Act and
establishing comprehensive hardrock mining legislation.48  The 103rd Con-
gress came the closest to enacting reform.  The House passed a bill entitled
the “Mineral Exploration and Development Act of 1993,” which found that
“[e]xisting Federal law and regulations, as well as applicable State laws, have
proven to be inadequate to ensure that active mining operations under the
Mining Law of 1872 will not leave to future generations a new legacy of
hazards associated with unreclaimed mined lands.”49  The Senate passed a
bill entitled the “Hardrock Mining Reform Act of 1993”; it had a markedly
different tone,50 which, along with certain provisions, led some to view it as a
mining-industry approach to reform.51  Despite the differing interests and a
few crucial provisions, the two bills had many similarities—notably, both
would have required financial assurance to cover complete reclamation.52
administering public land, and creates a breeding ground for speculators and opportun-
ists”); HUMPHRIES, supra note 40, at summary (“Critics consider the claim-patent system a
giveaway of publicly owned resources because of the small amounts paid to maintain a
claim and to obtain a patent.”); id. at 7 (noting the lack of environmental protection in the
law); John D. Leshy, Mining Law Reform Redux, Once More, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 461, 462
(2002) (noting the “modern environmental movement” and “opposition to the giveaway of
public resources” both triggered reform efforts).
43 Reform proposals to strengthen the law have called for providing greater environ-
mental protection, requiring royalties from operators, enabling greater administrative
authority, establishing a leasing system, and ending patenting. See, e.g., GERARD, supra note
1, at 3.
44 See HUMPHRIES, supra note 40, at 7.
45 See David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulation Reform in the Era of
Congressional Abdication, 35 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 55 (2014) (tracing the emer-
gence of the modern environmental movement).
46 One noteworthy amendment is discussed infra note 59 and accompanying text.
47 LESHY, supra note 35, at 2.
48 See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., supra note 12, § 173.01.
49 H.R. 322, 103d Cong. § 2(a)(8) (1993).
50 S. 775, 103d Cong. § 2(a)(8) (1993) (“[C]hanges in the general mining laws of the
United States . . . are desirable, so long as the changes do not adversely affect employment
in the mining industry or in industries that provide goods and services required for mining
activities, interfere with a secure and reliable supply of minerals, or adversely affect the
balance of trade of the United States.”).
51 See GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, THE MINING LAW OF 1872: PAST, POLITICS, AND PROS-
PECTS 154 (2008).
52 See H.R. 322 § 206; S. 775 § 8(a).
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Congress was unable to reconcile the differences, and the reform effort
failed.  Similar bills have been introduced in nearly every Congress since
then,53 the most recent bill being the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act
of 2017, which would have required both reclamation54 and financial assur-
ance.55  To date, none of these efforts have been successful.  Thus, the forces
of reform have been unable to prevail, and the General Mining Act continues
its perpetual motion.
B. Federal Regulations
Despite the lack of comprehensive hardrock mining legislation, two
pieces of legislation—the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
and the 1897 Organic Act—have enabled federal agencies to require recla-
mation and promulgate financial assurance regulations.  It is important to
keep in mind that these acts, administered by the BLM and the USFS, respec-
tively, are limited to federal lands.  Consequently, the federal agencies must
release any financial assurances once a claim is patented.56  But because a
moratorium on new patents has limited this possibility,57 and because many
hardrock mining operations are located at least in part on federal lands,58
the regulations made pursuant to these acts are important sources of law.
1. Bureau of Land Management
Pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), BLM promulgated regulations for hardrock mining that came to
be known as the “3809 regulations.”59  Interestingly, BLM drew on a provi-
sion in the FLPMA that expressly amended the General Mining Act of 1872
by directing the Secretary of the Interior to “take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”60  The 3809 regula-
tions created three levels of mining activities—“casual,” “notice,” and
53 See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., supra note 12, § 173.02.
54 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2017, S. 1833, 115th Cong. § 306 (2017).
55 Id. § 304.
56 See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.594(a) (2018).
57 See Seymour, supra note 16, at 831 n.171 (citing Pub. L. No. 103-332, §§ 112–13, 108
Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994)).
58 See id. at 804.  There are over 1000 notice- and plan-level operations on BLM lands.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-189R, HARDROCK MINING: BLM NEEDS TO
REVISE ITS SYSTEMS FOR ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCES 4 (2011).
59 Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902
(Nov. 26, 1980).  The regulations take their name from their location in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations: 43 C.F.R. § 3809. Id. at 78,909.
60 Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 § 302(b), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1732(b) (2012) (“Except as provided in [other sections] of this Act and in the last sen-
tence of this paragraph, no provision . . . shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or
impair the rights of any locators or claims under that Act . . . .  In managing the public
lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”).
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“plan”—that varied in terms of the extent of surface disturbance and
required reclamation for each level of use.61  The “most controversial” part
of the 3809 regulations were the bond “requirements,”62 though bonding
was discretionary rather than mandatory.63
There were several shortcomings with the regulations, such as the
exemption of notice-level operations from advance approval, the fact that
financial assurance was not truly required, and the lack of provisions impos-
ing administrative penalties for violations.64  New regulations came in
1997,65 but they were struck down in a lawsuit shortly thereafter.66  Congress
mandated a study of the regulatory framework governing hardrock mining
on federal lands,67 and BLM successfully adopted new regulations in 2000
that implemented several recommendations contained in the report.  These
regulations required financial assurance for one hundred percent of the esti-
mated reclamation costs for both notice- and plan-level operations.68  Addi-
tionally, BLM decided to disallow corporate guarantees (i.e., self-bonding).
BLM noted (1) the relative insecurity of corporate guarantees, partly because
of fluctuating commodity prices; (2) several bankruptcies that had recently
occurred; and (3) BLM’s lack of expertise in evaluating the guarantees.69
BLM’s promulgation of financial assurance requirements was tortuous
but represented a victory for advocates of more effective regulations.  How-
ever, subsequent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports reveal
ongoing issues with the regulations and implementation thereof.  In 2005,
GAO found several inadequacies in the administration of the financial assur-
ance requirements: (1) some operators did not even have financial assur-
ances; (2) some financial assurances were less than the most recent
reclamation cost estimates; and (3) some financial assurance providers went
bankrupt.70  In 2008, GAO found that fifty-two operations were insufficiently
bonded by a total of about $61 million.71  BLM reduced this amount by
61 Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws § 3809.1-1, 45 Fed.
Reg. at 78,911.
62 Id. at 78,907.
63 See id.; see also id. § 3809.1-9 at 78,913, (requiring no bonds for casual- or notice-level
uses and providing BLM with the “discretion” to require bonds for plan-level operations).
64 See Leshy, supra note 42, at 475–76.
65 See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 62 Fed. Reg. 9093 (Feb. 28,
1997).
66 See Nw. Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998).
67 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 1.
68 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552(a) (2018).  See §§ 3809.500–599 for the financial assurance
requirements.
69 Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,074 (Nov.
21, 2000).
70 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-377, HARDROCK MINING: BLM
NEEDS TO BETTER MANAGE FINANCIAL ASSURANCES TO GUARANTEE COVERAGE OF RECLAMA-
TION COSTS 6 (2005).
71 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-574T, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION
ON ABANDONED MINES AND VALUE AND COVERAGE OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCES ON BLM LAND
(2008).
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about $37 million in the ensuing three years, but there remained an esti-
mated $24 million shortfall.72  Of the operations with inadequate financial
assurances, Nevada contained nearly half, and it accounted for over ninety-
eight percent of the estimated insufficiency.73  Therefore, BLM has greatly
reduced the risk of public liability in most states since the enactment of the
FLPMA, but mining operations on federal lands in Nevada still present a
significant risk.
2. United States Forest Service
The history of bonding requirements on USFS lands has been much
more straightforward.  In 1974, USFS promulgated its “228 regulations” pur-
suant to the 1897 Organic Act.74  The regulations, similar to BLM regula-
tions, create a distinction between notice-level operations and plan-level
operations—they require a notice of intent to operate for “operations which
might cause significant disturbance of surface resources”; then, if an author-
ized officer determines significant disturbance is likely, an approved plan of
operations is required.75  Reclamation is required for all operations,76 but
like the original 3809 regulations, bonding is limited to plan-level uses and it
is discretionary.77  The regulations have remained in place since 1974 and
have not been substantially revised, despite one report suggesting a problem-
atic lack of specificity and comprehensiveness.78  However, these regulations
play a much smaller role than the 3809 regulations: from 2010 to 2014, BLM
approved sixty-six plan-level operations while USFS approved only two.79
C. State Regulations
BLM and USFS promulgated their respective regulations against the
backdrop of state regulations, which applied to both federal and state
lands.80  Historically, state regulations focused on the activities of miners vis-
à-vis each other rather than environmental protection.81  But with the rise of
the modern environmental movement came state legislation that required
reclamation and financial assurance for hardrock mining operations.  In
1963, Alaska became the first to do so, and several other western states fol-
72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-189R, supra note 58, at 4–5.
73 Id.
74 36 C.F.R. § 228 (2012).
75 Id. § 228.4.
76 See id. § 228.8(g).
77 See id. § 228.13.
78 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at IV-108.
79 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-165, supra note 21, at 13.
80 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at I-7.
81 LESHY, supra note 35, at 213 (“Until recent years, state regulation was mostly con-
cerned with the activities by the miners vis-à-vis each other, and did not consider environ-
mental protection. . . . [R]esponding to the same forces that led Congress to enact
numerous federal environmental regulatory schemes, the states have begun to adopt or
apply more aggressively their own regulatory schemes for Mining Law operations.”).
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lowed suit in the 1970s; by 1980, each of the twelve western states except for
Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona had reclamation and financial assurance
requirements in place.82
Although BLM and USFS could have preempted state laws with respect
to federal lands, the relationships between the agencies and the states have
been much more cooperative.  For example, BLM’s original 3809 regulations
expressly provided that an operator could comply with the bond requirement
by providing evidence of an existing bond pursuant to state law.83  Addition-
ally, there are often memoranda of understanding that formalize the rela-
tionships by delegating authority and responsibilities such as holding
financial assurances, and they help avoid duplicative bonding
requirements.84
Unsurprisingly, the state regulations vary in detail and substance.  One
example of this is which financial assurance instruments states will accept.
Commonly accepted forms include cash, certificates of deposit, letters of
credit, and corporate sureties.85  Some states also accept deeds of trust for
real estate or liens on equipment,86 and some states, especially those where
mining industry influence is greatest, also accept self-bonding (or corporate
guarantees).87  Self-bonding is somewhat of a misnomer and is perhaps the
most concerning form of financial assurance—it is a “corporate promise[ ]
without separate surety or collateral.”88  This form relies solely on financial
statements, thereby eliminating the cost of procuring or posting another
form of assurance, making them an industry favorite.89  But if a company
fails, the promise becomes enforceable only through bankruptcy proceed-
ings,90 so the government is likely to recover less than the complete financial
82 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at I-2 tbl.1.1.1, I-3 tbl.1.1.2.  While no date is listed in the
report for Wyoming, its Environmental Quality Act was enacted in 1973. See Wyoming
Environmental Quality Act of 1973, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-417 (2018) (requiring recla-
mation bonds).  Additionally, New Mexico did not enact the New Mexico Mining Act until
1993. See New Mexico Mining Act of 1993, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-36-1 to -20 (2018).  The
confusion may come from the fact that the official statutory compilation of the state is the
New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978 (Conway Greene).
83 See Surface Management of Public Lands Under U.S. Mining Laws, 45 Fed. Reg.
78,902, 78,913 (Nov. 26, 1980).
84 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at I-7.
85 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 217.
86 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at I-14.
87 See id.; DIAMOND, supra note 14, at 457 (“[T]he two states with the biggest taxpayer
liabilities (Arizona and Nevada) accept[ ] company self-guarantees . . . .”); see also id.
(“[F]requent breaking of such pledges has shown self-guarantees to be meaningless, and
they are now no longer accepted for mines on federal land, but they still account for most
assurance in Arizona and Nevada, the American states most friendly to the mining
industry.”).
88 Self-Bonding Facts, OFF. SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION & ENFORCEMENT, https://www
.osmre.gov/resources/selfBonding.shtm (last updated Apr. 24, 2017).
89 See KUIPERS, supra note 36, at I-13.
90 See id. at I-13 to I-14.
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assurance.91  Moreover, self-bonding requires significant administrative over-
sight,92 and the relevant agencies arguably do not have the institutional
capacity to perform the oversight.  Nevada is one state that accepts self-bond-
ing,93 which is particularly important because it contains about one-fourth of
the hardrock mines that could be regulated under section 108(b) of CER-
CLA, which will be discussed at length below.94
Another way in which the state programs vary is their comprehensive-
ness.  For example, Montana’s Metal Mine Reclamation Act is highly
detailed, though it became so only after the catastrophe at the Zortman-
Landusky Mines, which will be discussed below.95  Following that incident,
Montana adopted several amendments that strengthened bonding require-
ments.96  The result of the reforms, as well as better information concerning
reclamation costs, has been a significant increase in bonding amounts:
according to the Department of Environmental Equality, there were about
$198.7 million in bonds in 2004 and about $347 million in bonds as of
August 2017.97  At the other end of the spectrum is Nevada, which has “per-
haps the least comprehensive and detailed reclamation requirements of any
western state.”98  While Nevada’s statute is broad and lacks detail, the regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto are quite detailed.99  But regulations are
much easier to change than statutes, so there exists a possibility of alleviating
the regulatory burden, especially given the important role gold mining plays
in the Nevada economy.  In response to criticisms, Nevada maintains it has
not had a case requiring public funding for mines that began operations after
its rules were put in place in 1991,100 though Nevada does not note how
many mines that includes.  Assuming this statement is technically true, it still
91 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BONDING FOR RECLAIMING FEDERAL LANDS 14 (2003).
92 See id.
93 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 519A.350 (2016) (allowing the use of self-bonding for up to
seventy-five percent of the required assurance).  Other examples include Arizona and Col-
orado, although the Colorado House of Representatives recently passed a bill to ban self-
bonding. See Tripp Baltz & Stephen Lee, Hardrock Miners’ Self-Bonding Ban Passes Colorado
House, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 16, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/envi-
ronment-and-energy/hardrock-miners-self-bonding-ban-passes-colorado-house.
94 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7568.
95 See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.  For the current version of the Mon-
tana Metal Mine Reclamation Act, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-4-301 to -390 (West 2018).
96 See generally H.B. 69, 2001 Leg., 57th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2001) (providing for the
suspension of permits upon the failure to post an increased bond amount and adding a
“bad actor” provision); H.B. 183, 1999 Leg., 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) (removing caps
on bonds, requiring the addition of state site management costs during the liquidation of
the bond, and mandating annual bond overviews).
97 JOE KOLMAN, MONT. ENVTL. QUALITY COUNCIL, HARD ROCK MINING - UPDATE 9
(2017).
98 KUIPERS, supra note 36, at II-44.
99 See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., supra note 12, § 173.03. Compare
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 519A.010–.290 (2018), with NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 519A.245–390 (2016).
100 Greg Lovato, Administrator, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Com-
ment Letter on Propoposed Rule on Financial Responsibility Requirements: CERCLA for
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conveniently excludes at least one relevant occurrence: a copper mining
company that used self-bonding declared bankruptcy in 1997 and subse-
quently abandoned operations, leaving less than the necessary reclamation
costs.101  As noted above, Nevada accounts for over ninety-eight percent of
the estimated insufficiency of financial assurances on BLM lands,102 so it may
be only a matter of time before the risk of public liability is realized.  And it is
worth emphasizing that the risks of inadequate state programs are not con-
fined to the respective states—if hazardous contaminants are released and
financial assurance is insufficient, taxpayers around the country may bear the
burden through the Superfund process.103
II. CERCLA SECTION 108(b)
Because most states have enacted hardrock mining laws that include
financial assurance requirements, and because federal regulations from BLM
and USFS cover federal lands, the key question becomes: Do these regula-
tions sufficiently minimize the risk of public liability?  Montana’s system may
do so; however, its amendments came only after taxpayers became saddled
with tens of millions of dollars in cleanup costs at two mines.  The experience
in Nevada has been at the other end of the spectrum: while it hasn’t had a
site require public funds for operations commenced after 1991, its regula-
tions, which allow for self-bonding, have enabled a significant risk of taxpayer
liability.  At the federal level, BLM (which issues far more permits for plan-
level operations than the USFS) has reduced but not eliminated the risk of
public liability for operations on federal lands.  Several reports suggest the
answer to the question posed is no and have offered a solution: EPA should
promulgate financial assurance requirements pursuant to section 108(b) of
CERCLA.104
Before considering section 108(b) of CERCLA, it is helpful to briefly
examine a few cases where financial assurance requirements proved severely
inadequate following bankruptcies of mine operators and owners, as these
bankruptcies are often cited as evidence of the need for better financial
Classes of Facilities in the Harrock Mining Industry (July 11, 2017), https://www.regula-
tions.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-SFUND-2015-0781-2651.
101 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 91, at 15.
102 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16, at 10–11 (“Restrictions on states’
abilities to require reasonable levels of financial assurance could result in states’ inabilities
to adequately respond to a catastrophic release of hazardous contaminants to the environ-
ment, such as occurred at the Summitville mine site in Colorado.  If a state is unable to
respond, EPA may have to assume responsibility under Superfund.”).
104 See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text; cf. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 16, at v (“We found critical gaps in some federal and state statutory and regula-
tory authorities to require adequate financial assurances at hardrock mines.  This lack of
adequate financial assurances could result in EPA having to assume responsibility for
cleaning up some hardrock mine sites in the future.  EPA had not effectively implemented
its existing statutory authorities or used non-regulatory tools . . . to . . . help federal and
state agencies eliminate financial assurance gaps.”).
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assurance requirements.  While there have been many bankruptcies in the
industry in recent decades,105 three have been particularly devastating.
The Summitville mine in Colorado has been the costliest to taxpayers.
Galactic Resources, the operator of the mine, received a permit in 1984 and,
after only eight years, declared bankruptcy.106  It provided less than a week’s
notice that it would be closing the mine, but more troubling was that it aban-
doned the mine, thereby halting environmental protective procedures.107
When winter came a few months later, snowfall caused the heap leach system
to overflow, ultimately “sterilizing an 18-mile stretch of the Alamosa River
with cyanide.”108  In addition to the immediate environmental hazards cre-
ated, Galactic’s financial assurance was a mere $4.5 million.109  So far, the
cost to taxpayers has exceeded $250 million.110
Six years later, disaster struck in Montana.  Pegasus Gold and its subsidi-
ary operating company, Zortman Mining, began operating the Zortman and
Landusky gold mines in Montana in 1979.111  The mines were the first large-
scale use of the open-pit cyanide heap leach process,112 which, as its name
suggests, involves the use of cyanide to extract precious metals from ore.  In
1980, the price of gold had peaked at more than $850 per ounce, but by
1997, prices had decreased to $238 per ounce.113  Pegasus responded by clos-
ing some mines, but the company ultimately declared bankruptcy in 1998,
leaving about eighty-five percent of the site unreclaimed.114  The reclama-
tion bonds were well short of the necessary cleanup costs.  The State alone
has allocated an estimated $32 million for reclamation, much of this to estab-
lish a trust fund for ongoing water treatment, which is expected to cost
between $2 million and $2.5 million per year; and it is estimated BLM has
contributed over $17 million.115  In addition to the bankruptcy, the company
came under fire because the board of directors had voted to give themselves
105 See, e.g., Modern Mining, EARTHWORKS (Aug. 30, 2007), https://earthworks.org/pub-
lications/modern_mining/ (cataloguing sixteen mines where the owners declared bank-
ruptcy in the 1990s).
106 See DIAMOND, supra note 14, at 456.
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 456–57.
110 Bruce Finley, EPA Granting Colorado $1 Million for Summitville Toxic Mine Cleanup, One
of Many Still Not Complete, DENVER POST (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/
2017/02/28/summitville-mine-cleanup-superfund-epa-grant/.
111 See BUREAU LAND MGMT. & MONT. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR RECLAMATION OF THE ZORTMAN AND LANDUSKY MINES 1-
1 (2001).
112 See JIM KUIPERS, MINERAL POLICY CTR., MPC ISSUE PAPER NO. 4, PUTTING A PRICE ON
POLLUTION: FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR MINE RECLAMATION AND CLOSURE 14 (2003).
113 Robert McLure, Pegasus Gold—From Boom to Bankruptcy, MONT. STANDARD (June 24,
2001), https://mtstandard.com/news/pegasus-gold—-from-boom-to-bankruptcy/arti-
cle_7a82e59e-9aec-5d6a-a376-bc4ecf492ac9.html.
114 DIAMOND, supra note 14, at 456; McLure, supra note 113.
115 See, e.g., Karl Puckett, Fort Belknap Backs State in Bad Actor Case Over Zortman-Landsky
Pollution, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/
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bonuses exceeding $5 million just before declaring bankruptcy.116  Perhaps
more troubling was the board’s decision to transfer the profitable assets from
Pegasus to Apollo Gold, which they had created, prior to declaring
bankruptcy.117
The final significant bankruptcy also occurred in the 1990s, involving
Dakota Mining Co.  Its subsidiary, Brohm Mining, operated the Gilt Edge
Mine in South Dakota.  The state had a reclamation bond of only $6 million.
Initially, it was estimated that cleanup would be between $12 million and $15
million;118 however, like the other sites, costs have far exceeded the estimate.
When EPA listed the site on the National Priorities List (NPL), it estimated
remediation costs of $50.3 million, which did not “include water collection
and treatment costs that will be handled under additional remediation plans.
As of October 2007, EPA expenditures at this site exceeded $56.1 million.”119
Water treatment costs alone are estimated to be $1.3 million per year.120
Presently, the site is estimated to cost $200 million to clean up, most of which
will be funded through Superfund, though settlements have reduced the cost
to taxpayers by about $40 million.121
These bankruptcies offer a glimpse into the substantial costs that arise
during reclamation and demonstrate the necessity of sufficient and robust
financial assurance instruments to cover all reclamation costs, especially
water treatment.  Particularly relevant here is that in each of these cases, EPA
has listed the site on the NPL, prompting the following criticism: by failing to
exercise its authority to promulgate financial assurance requirements under
CERCLA, EPA is contributing to the creation of new Superfund sites.122
The following Sections examine section 108(b) of CERCLA, which
expressly addresses financial assurance requirements; EPA’s neglect of the
provision in the decades following the enactment of CERCLA; calls for EPA
to act; and the litigation and administrative actions surrounding the provi-
sion in the past decade.
news/2018/09/13/cleanup-costs-zortman-landsky-gold-mines-continue-mount-montana-
bad-actor-superfund-acid/1292506002/.
116 DIAMOND, supra note 14, at 456; KUIPERS, supra note 111, at 14.
117 See DIAMOND, supra note 14, at 456; KUIPERS, supra note 111, at 14.
118 MINERAL POLICY CTR., MPC REPORT NO. 1, SIX MINES, SIX MISHAPS 10 (1999).
119 EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,218.
120 Bob Mercer, Millions More to Be Spent Cleaning Up Gilt Edge Mine Near Lead, RAPID
CITY J. (May 19, 2017), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/millions-more-to-be-
spent-cleaning-up-gilt-edge-mtstandardmine/article_fd9041a9-0ee4-5f86-a2b8-
079b3f581778.html.
121 News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Recovers over $10 Million for Past Costs at
the Gilt Edge Mine Superfund Site in South Dakota (Apr. 15, 2016).
122 See Margaret Talbot, Dirty Politics: Scott Pruitt’s E.P.A. Is Giving Even Ostentatious Pol-
luters a Reprieve, NEW YORKER, Apr. 2, 2018, at 38, 50; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 16, at v–vi (“Federal and state land management agencies’ authorities to require
environmental performance standards and financial assurances at hardrock mines varied,
leaving critical gaps in bonding requirements. . . . As a result, EPA may become liable for
the considerable costs of cleaning up mines abandoned by the companies that operated
them.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 16 29-MAY-19 15:43
1870 notre dame law review [vol. 94:4
A. Section 108(b) of CERCLA and EPA Inaction
As noted above, no comprehensive treatment of hardrock mining has
emerged from Congress.  This helps explain the lack of federal financial
assurance requirements applicable to all hardrock mining operations.  But it
does not capture the full story.
CERCLA became law on December 11, 1980, after a hurried effort by
Congress to enact hazardous waste cleanup legislation before President Rea-
gan and a Republican majority in the Senate took office.123  Congress had
been working on similar bills to address hazardous wastes but had failed to
reconcile differing versions in the House and Senate.124  Faced with a now-
or-never situation in the eyes of some,125 a bipartisan group introduced and
pushed the bill through the Senate, and the House passed it after very little
debate.126  As a result of this rapid process, there is very little legislative his-
tory on the bill that became law.127  Nevertheless, the legislative process pro-
duced a provision—section 108(b)—expressly addressing financial assurance
requirements:
(1) Beginning not earlier than five years after December 11, 1980, the
[EPA] shall promulgate requirements . . . that classes of facilities establish
and maintain evidence of financial responsibility consistent with the degree
and duration of risk associated with the production, transportation, treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances. . . .
(2) The level of financial responsibility shall be initially established,
and, when necessary, adjusted to protect against the level of risk which the
[EPA] in [its] discretion believes is appropriate based on the payment expe-
rience of the Fund, commercial insurers, courts settlements and judgments,
and voluntary claims satisfaction.128
Despite the timeframe the statute imposed, EPA had not established any
financial assurance requirements when pressure began to build.  In response
to bankruptcies such as the ones described above, GAO issued reports calling
attention to EPA’s inaction with respect to section 108(b).  In GAO’s view,
“EPA could better ensure that bankrupt and other financially distressed busi-
nesses carry out their cleanup responsibilities by making greater use of
existing authorities,” such as the “1980 statutory mandate under Superfund
123 See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982); John
Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1407–08 (1997).
124 See Nagle, supra note 123, at 1407.
125 See J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 379 (4th ed.
2016) (“[T]he concern is whether we are going to have legislation or whether we [are] not
going to have legislation.” (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 31,968–69 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Florio))).
126 See Grad, supra note 123, at 1.
127 See id.
128 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1)–(2) (2012).  The first provision originally required the Pres-
ident, as opposed to the EPA, to promulgate the requirements, but President Reagan dele-
gated the task to the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2927 (Jan. 29,
1987); Exec. Order 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237, 42,239 (August 14, 1981).
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to require businesses handling hazardous substances to maintain financial
assurances.”129  “By its inaction on this mandate, EPA has continued to
expose . . . the U.S. taxpayers[ ] to potentially enormous cleanup costs at
facilities that currently are not required to have financial assurances for
cleanup costs, such as many gold, lead, and other hardrock mining
sites . . . .”130  GAO suggested hardrock mining would be a good candidate
for action under section 108(b) because of the significant risk of taxpayer
liability it presents: it is generally excluded from the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, there are no federal financial assurance requirements for
hardrock mining on private lands, hardrock mining presents a serious risk of
environmental damage, and the mining sites are often difficult and expen-
sive to reclaim.131  Additionally, GAO noted gaps in existing federal and state
requirements.132  GAO issued a report the following year, echoing its assess-
ment and adding that financial assurance requirements would mitigate the
risk of businesses reorganizing their assets to limit their responsibility for the
costs of reclamation.133
Around this time period, EPA performed studies relating to section
108(b),134 and in 2009, it issued a notice that “hardrock mining facilities
present the type of risk that . . . justifies designating such facilities as those for
which EPA will first develop financial responsibility requirements.”135  EPA
cited many factors, including the quantities and types of wastes involved, the
number of hardrock mining facilities, the number of sites in the CERCLA
site inventory, the projected cleanup costs, and the corporate structure and
bankruptcy potential of owners and operators.136  However, despite this
notice, EPA had not proposed any rules by 2014, prompting a collection of
environmental groups to petition the D.C. Circuit for a writ of mandamus
requiring EPA to promulgate financial assurance requirements.137  During
litigation, EPA and the petitioners made a joint motion for an order on con-
sent establishing a schedule for rulemaking—EPA would begin the process
by December 1, 2016, and publish its notice of final action one year later.138
129 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-658, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: EPA
SHOULD DO MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS 5
(2005).
130 Id.; see id. at 33.
131 See id. at 35–36.
132 See id. at 36 n.68.
133 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-884T, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES:
HARDROCK MINING CLEANUP OBLIGATIONS 5 (2006).
134 See generally EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7559.
135 EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,214.  Although EPA had been study-
ing the problem, EPA didn’t issue the notice until after a group sued in California. See In
re Idaho Conservation League, 811 F.3d 502, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Sierra Club v.
Johnson, No. C 08-01409, 2009 WL 482248, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009)).
136 EPA’s 2009 Priority Notice, supra note 11, at 37,218.
137 See In re Idaho Conservation League, 811 F.3d at 506.
138 See id. at 507.
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The D.C. Circuit granted the motion and issued an order.139  Thus, a plan of
action was now in place thirty-six years after CERCLA’s enactment.
B. EPA in Action
1. Proposed Regulations
Consistent with the schedule, EPA proposed its regulations at the tail
end of the Obama presidency,140 and those regulations were published on
January 11, 2017.141  The proposal is highly detailed, but a few aspects are
particularly relevant here—(1) the means by which financial assurance
amounts would be determined, (2) the range of acceptable instruments, and
(3) the relationship of the proposed requirements to existing federal regula-
tions and state laws.
In contrast to traditional approaches—which typically establish costs
based upon prescribed reclamation standards—EPA proposed using a
detailed formula untied to any reclamation requirements.142  There are
three components to the formula, which are consistent with the types of CER-
CLA liabilities: response costs, natural resource damages, and health assess-
ment costs.143  The formula assigns values for various site characteristics,
such as tailings ponds, heap leaching, etc., but it is decidedly not a site-spe-
cific approach.144  Site-specificity may enable more precision, but EPA was
willing to sacrifice precision for ease of administration, as a case-by-case, site-
specific approach would pose a significant burden.145  In EPA’s view, the
formula would sufficiently reflect the risks involved with hazardous sub-
stances at hardrock mining facilities, consistent with the command of section
108(b).146
Once a financial assurance amount is established, the next question is
which instruments are available to satisfy it.  Section 108(b) authorizes a
number of financial assurance instruments, including self-bonding.147  Given
this flexibility, EPA offered two proposals: in the first, third-party financial
instruments would be the only acceptable forms of assurance, whereas in the
139 See id. at 515–16.
140 See Superfund Financial Responsibility, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www
.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-financial-responsibility (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
141 EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3388.
142 See id. at 3400–02.  For the formula, see id. at 3467.
143 See id. at 3461.
144 See id. at 3401.
145 See id.; see also id. at 3460 (noting that a site-specific approach would be the “most
precise” but also “the most resource intensive to implement”); cf. EPA’s Financial Assur-
ance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7568 (noting that the formula would underestimate
at some sites and overestimate at others, and that the site-specific approaches of existing
programs better reflect the actual costs).
146 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3461.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2) (2012) (authorizing several forms of financial assurance
instruments, including insurance, guarantees, surety bonds, letters of credit, and self-
bonding).
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second, an owner or operator could pass a financial test and qualify for self-
bonding.148  Due to concerns with self-bonding, EPA recommended against
allowing a financial test.149  EPA estimated that the annual costs to industry
of securing third-party financial assurance instruments under the two alterna-
tives would be $171 million and $111 million, respectively.150  Based on an
estimated public liability of $527 million over thirty-four years, the first alter-
native would eliminate this liability and the second would reduce it to $16
million.151  Forcing the internalization of this liability would, in EPA’s view,
lead to better environmental practices and, consequently, fewer uses of
Superfund resources.152
Aside from the abovementioned features, a significant concern through-
out the rulemaking process was the effect the proposed regulations would
have on existing federal and state financial assurance programs.  But EPA
made one thing clear—it did not seek to supplant any regulations: “EPA has
concluded that CERCLA § 108(b) requirements apply in addition to require-
ments under other Federal law.  EPA also believes that preemption of state
reclamation bonding programs is not intended by CERCLA, nor necessary or
appropriate.”153  Thus, the proposed regulations would “effectively comple-
ment, not duplicate or disrupt, those programs.”154  Existing federal regula-
tions such as those of BLM and USFS were, in EPA’s view, geared toward
reclamation, whereas it sought to address CERCLA liabilities.155  Therefore,
EPA found its proposed regulations appropriate and consistent with section
108(b), which called for financial assurance requirements “in addition to
those under . . . other Federal law.”156  As for state bonding programs, EPA
concluded that the proposed regulations would not have federalism implica-
tions,157 notwithstanding section 114(d),158 which reads:
Except as provided in this subchapter, no owner or operator of a . . . facility
who establishes and maintains evidence of financial responsibility in accor-
dance with this subchapter shall be required under any State or local law,
rule, or regulation to establish or maintain any other evidence of financial
responsibility in connection with liability for the release of a hazardous sub-
stance from such . . . facility.  Evidence of compliance with the financial
responsibility requirements of this subchapter shall be accepted by a State in
lieu of any other requirement of financial responsibility imposed by such
148 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3390, 3402.
149 See id. at 3433–36.
150 Id. at 3393.
151 Id. at 3395.
152 See id. at 3395–96.
153 Id. at 3402.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 3403.
156 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1) (2012).
157 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3484.
158 Id. at 3403.
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State in connection with liability for the release of a hazardous substance
from such . . . facility.159
EPA espoused four reasons for its conclusion.  The first and third rea-
sons were closely connected: section 108(b) is intended to address CERCLA
liabilities, and, similar to its discussion of federal regulations, EPA found that
many state requirements are not tailored to CERCLA liabilities but to recla-
mation; thus, “those state requirements should not be considered to be ‘in
connection with liability for the release of hazardous substance[s].’”160  The
second reason was that EPA found section 114 generally to reflect a congres-
sional intent to have limited preemptive effect.161  EPA derived this intent in
part from section 114(a), which reads, “Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances
within such State.”162  Further, EPA noted section 114(d) contains a qualifi-
cation—“[e]xcept as provided”—which should be read in conjunction with
the preemption limitations in section 114(a), the final result being the pres-
ervation of state programs as “ ‘additional requirements’ to the extent that
they may also address the release of hazardous substances.”163  In a footnote,
EPA noted that while state programs would be considered additional require-
ments, CERCLA itself prevented duplication (i.e., companies would not have
to double pay were the state and section 108(b) requirements to address the
same costs).164  EPA’s final reason for its interpretation was pragmatic: its
formula necessarily could not accommodate the vastly differing reclamation
requirements among the states, and moreover, addressing CERCLA liabilities
and reclamation requirements are different goals that do not overlap per-
fectly, as noted above.165
Despite its assertions that preemption of state bonding programs is “not
intended by CERCLA, nor necessary or appropriate,”166 certain language
could be read to suggest there may be some preemption.167  Moreover, EPA
noted it was merely “providing its general views on the preemption issue,”
and that it would be “courts that would make any final determinations” for
159 42 U.S.C. § 9614(d).
160 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3403 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(d)).
161 See id.
162 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
163 EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3403 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(d)).
164 See id. at 3404 n.47.
165 See id. at 3404.
166 Id. at 3402.
167 See id. at 3403 (“EPA does not intend its CERCLA § 108(b) regulations to result in
widespread displacement of [state] programs . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (“EPA does not
believe that CERCLA § 114(d) gives a broad preemptive effect . . . over state reclamation
bonding requirements generally.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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facilities on a case-by-case basis.168  As we shall see, EPA’s analysis did not
ease states’ fear of preemption.
2. Decision Not to Adopt the Proposed Regulations
After a change of administration, EPA decided not to issue financial
assurance regulations.169  Scott Pruitt, then-EPA Administrator, visited a
mine in Nevada the month the decision was published in the Federal Regis-
ter, assuring miners that EPA “would no longer be ‘weaponized’ against
them.”170  According to the published decision, EPA determined the regula-
tions were unnecessary “based on EPA’s interpretation of the statute and
analysis of its record developed for this rulemaking,”171 although EPA cited
several other considerations in its decision.
EPA’s interpretation expanded the scope of acceptable factors for deter-
mining the “degree and duration of risk” of classes of facilities potentially
subject to section 108(b).172  The decision noted that while section
108(b)(2) articulates a list of considerations for formulating financial assur-
ance requirements—“the payment experience of the Fund, commercial
insurers, courts settlements and judgments, and voluntary claims satisfac-
tion”173—the “list is not exclusive.”174  This construction enabled it to make
its key move: based upon legislative history and the implications of section
114(d), EPA posited that the statute authorized it to “consider . . . the exis-
tence of federal and state regulations” to avoid duplicative requirements.175
Under this interpretation, EPA could consider the sufficiency of existing reg-
ulations before developing its own regulations;176 by contrast, “[t]he proposed
rule would have considered the risk reduction of existing regulations only as
a means to reduce the amount of otherwise required financial responsibility
and sought comment on several aspects of this approach.”177
Pursuant to this new interpretation, EPA reevaluated the administrative
record and concluded that existing regulations “obviate the need for addi-
tional financial responsibility requirements under section 108(b) on the har-
168 Id. at 3403 n.46.
169 See News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Determines Risks from Hardrock Mining
Industry Minimal and No Need for Additional Federal Requirements (Dec. 1, 2017).
170 Talbot, supra note 122, at 50 (quoting Pruitt).
171 EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7556.
172 Id. at 7561–63; see also id. at 7557 (“The statute . . . requires that the level of finan-
cial responsibility be established to protect against the level of risk the [EPA], in [its] dis-
cretion, believes is appropriate . . . .”).
173 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2) (2012).
174 EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7562.
175 Id.
176 See id.; see also id. at 7557 (“EPA now believes that it is appropriate to consider [fed-
eral and state regulatory] programs at the outset, when evaluating both the degree and
duration of risk associated with the production, transportation, treatment, storage, or dis-
posal of hazardous substances as well as when evaluating the risk of taxpayer financed
response costs.”).
177 Id. at 7567.
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drock mining sector.”178  This conclusion contradicts the reports noted
above,179 as well as the evidence in the 2017 proposal.  However, the final
decision implicitly acknowledges this tension when, later in the decision, it
weighs the costs to industry with the expected decrease in public liability:
“[T]he projected annualized costs to industry ($111–$171 million) are an
order of magnitude higher than the avoided costs to the government
($15–15.5 million) sought by the rule.”180  Embedded within this statement
is a normative view that the public should directly bear at least some of the
externalities generated by hardrock mining (at least where the costs to indus-
try far exceed the benefits to the public).
In addition to existing regulations, EPA distinguished modern mining
practices from legacy practices, noting that practices have changed over the
decades as a result of more stringent regulations.181  It noted that many of
the sites that have required public funds for reclamation were permitted
before the 1990s, and that Nevada, which contains about one-fourth of “har-
drock mines in the potentially regulated universe of mines developed by EPA
for purposes of analysis in the proposed rule, has not had a case involving
taxpayer funded response action since 1991, when the state’s new rules were
put in place”182 (though, as noted above, the persuasiveness of this proposi-
tion is questionable).183  EPA dismissed the fact that hardrock mining facili-
ties still contain many of the same hazardous substances as past facilities,
noting that “[t]he mere presence of hazardous substances is not equivalent
to risk.”184  Therefore, it posited that the risks posed by facilities have
decreased substantially.185
Beyond its interpretation and the reevaluation of the administrative
record, EPA concluded by noting “[o]bstacles to developing and implement-
ing” financial assurance: the disruption of state mining programs due to sec-
tion 114(d), the difficulty of determining the level of financial assurance,
concerns regarding costs industry, and concerns regarding the availability of
financial assurance requirements.186
Environmental groups generally supported the proposed rule to miti-
gate the risk of taxpayers incurring reclamation costs and to ensure timely
cleanup of hazardous materials, and a collection of such groups recently peti-
tioned the D.C. Circuit for a review of EPA’s action.187  Since then, several
states (Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have inter-
178 Id.; see also id. at 7563–68.
179 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
180 EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7563.
181 See id. at 7570–83.
182 Id. at 7568.
183 See supra discussion accompanying notes 97–102.
184 EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7564.
185 See id. at 7564–65, 7567–68.
186 Id. at 7583–86.
187 See Petition for Review, Idaho Conservation League v. Pruitt, No. 18-1141 (D.C. Cir.
May 16, 2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 23 29-MAY-19 15:43
2019] financial  assurance  for  hardrock  mining 1877
vened in opposition to the petitioners to express concerns over the potential
duplicative and preemptive effects requirements under section 108(b) would
have.188
III. THE SCOPE OF EPA’S SECTION 108(b) AUTHORITY
The most recent lawsuit may frame and perhaps decide some issues
relating to EPA’s authority under section 108(b), but its central focus is nec-
essarily on the EPA’s final decision not to adopt the proposed regulations.
By contrast, this Note seeks to define the scope of EPA’s authority by focusing
on the statute’s import.  Deciphering CERCLA is no easy task: the statute
generally lacks clarity, legislative history, and discernible congressional
intent.189  Notwithstanding these difficulties, this Note forges ahead by con-
sidering the text in light of the relevant background outlined above.
The threshold determination is whether the statute creates a mandatory
duty or discretionary authority, which involves two related questions: (1)
Does section 108(b) create a statutory duty for the EPA to establish financial
assurance requirements?  And if so, (2) must EPA promulgate regulations for
hardrock mining?  If the answer to one or both of these questions is no, EPA’s
recent action is likely valid, but there would be ongoing risks of taxpayer
liability and implications for section 108(b).  If the answer to both is yes, it is
worthwhile to explore the lower and upper limits of that authority.
A. The Duty
The first consideration in this inquiry must be the text of section 108(b)
of CERCLA, which reads in relevant part: “[EPA] shall promulgate requirements
. . . that classes of facilities establish and maintain evidence of financial
responsibility consistent with the degree and duration of risk associated with
the production, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
substances.”190  The use of “shall” seems to answer the first question: EPA has
a statutory duty to establish financial assurance requirements for at least
some classes of facilities.191  That EPA has not done so in the thirty-eight
years CERCLA has been law, despite the prescribed timetable, does not
188 See Motion to Intervene in Support of Respondents at 1, 5–6, Idaho Conservation
League, No. 18-1141.
189 See Nagle, supra note 123, at 1406–07.
190 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
191 Of course, EPA has many obligations under various environmental statutes.  It also
has several goals within its broad mission of “protect[ing] human health and the environ-
ment.” Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).  As such, it is a “multiple-
goal agency,” and there is necessarily a risk of underperformance across these goals due to
resource constraints and differing incentives. See generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to
Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(2009).  “But the problem of limited resources does not justify a broad rule immunizing
inaction from judicial review.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v.
Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675 (1985).
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absolve EPA of this duty.  Thus, we must turn to the more difficult of the
threshold questions: whether EPA must promulgate requirements for hardrock
mining.
The purely textual answer seems to be no because section 108(b) of
CERCLA does not mention hardrock mining (as the respondents point
out),192 or any specific industries for that matter.  However, because EPA
must establish requirements for at least some facilities, it would be paradoxi-
cal to enable EPA to take the purely textual argument to its logical extreme—
whereby EPA must regulate some classes of facilities, but for any individual
class of facilities it could choose not to regulate.  Accordingly, a proper inter-
pretation must take into account other considerations contained in the text.
By its terms, section 108(b) targets facilities engaged in the “production,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous substances,” with
priority for those that present the “highest level of risk of injury.”193
Although section 108(b)(2) pertains to the level of financial responsibility
and the acceptable instruments, it provides further considerations—financial
assurance should “protect against the [appropriate] level of risk . . . based on
the payment experience of the Fund, commercial insurers, courts settle-
ments and judgments, and voluntary claims satisfaction.”194
To begin with, hardrock mining facilities plainly involve hazardous sub-
stances.  Moreover, as the bankruptcies and subsequent taxpayer-funded
response actions highlight, there is an ongoing risk that financial responsibil-
ity will fall on taxpayers.  But one point of tension related to the risks is when
to consider existing regulations—when determining if requirements are nec-
essary, or when determining the amount of financial assurance.  Both the
proposal and decision take existing regulations into account, even though
the statute does not expressly call for consideration thereof; nonetheless,
The Fourth Circuit recently refused to compel EPA to carry out a nondiscretionary
duty. See Murray Energy Corp. v. Adm’r of EPA, 861 F.3d 529 (4th Cir. 2017).  Under
section 321(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA is to conduct continuing evaluations of the
employment impact of the CAA. See id. at 532.  A collection of energy companies brought
suit, alleging EPA was failing to comply with the duty. See id. at 532–33.  However, the
court held that because EPA’s duty was not “specific and discrete” but was rather a “broad,
open-ended statutory mandate,” it was not “amenable to . . . review.” Id. at 536.  The court
relied on three considerations: (1) that “evaluations” is an ambiguous term; (2) the evalua-
tions duty would extend to an extensive class, all actions under the CAA; and “most impor-
tantly,” (3) the duty is ongoing rather than confined to a discrete time period. Id.  The
court also noted the lack of guidelines and “time-related instructions.” Id.  But section
108(b) of CERCLA is much more specific and contains guidelines.  Promulgating financial
assurance requirements is a more discrete task than conducting evaluations.  And the duty
to promulgate requirements is confined to a discrete time period; moreover, Congress
explicitly set a timeframe, though EPA did not comply.
192 See Response Brief for the Respondents at 17, Idaho Conservation League, No. 18-1141
(noting that CERCLA section 108(b) “does not discuss the hardrock mining industry”).
193 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1) (2012).
194 Id. § 9608(b)(2).
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existing regulations are relevant in assessing the risk of taxpayer liability.  In
any event, interpretations on this point are entitled to Chevron deference.195
Regardless of when existing regulations are considered, the question
posed at the beginning of Part II remains relevant: Do existing regulations
sufficiently minimize the risk of public liability?  The question is framed as
“sufficiently minimize” because it is quite clear existing regulations have not
eliminated the risk.  Based on the foregoing discussion, the answer seems to
be no, but this depends on one’s view of what an acceptable level of public
liability is.  EPA’s decision weighed the costs to the industry against the cost-
savings to the public and concluded between $511 million and $527 million
in public liability over thirty-four years (between $15 million and $15.5 mil-
lion annually) did not justify an annual burden on industry of between
$111million and $171 million.196  This raises the normative question of
whether the public should bear some of the externalities generated by har-
drock mining.  The industry is important to the economies of several states
through royalties and taxes, and it contributes hundreds of millions in taxes
to the federal government.  Thus, one could conclude that imposing costly
financial assurance requirements on an industry already highly vulnerable as
a result of other regulations, a volatile economy, and massive capital expendi-
tures would be prohibitively burdensome for many operators, thus counsel-
ing against new regulations.  At the other end, one could conclude that
regulations should seek to eliminate the estimated public liability, and if the
industry cannot bear the costs, perhaps the industry is financially unsound
and should not be subsidized—that is, the government should opt for the
role of the “prudent lawgiver.”197  Though, perhaps a subsidized mining
industry is necessary because of the important uses of hardrock minerals
(e.g., national defense).  This Note does not propose an answer to the nor-
mative question, but it does posit that existing regulations are insufficient.
If EPA’s decision is upheld and the financial assurance requirements for
hardrock mining are not mandatory, it seems that section 108(b) of CERCLA
would be functionally repealed.  Hardrock mining may be the industry
presenting the greatest risk of public liability, as suggested by the GAO
reports, the 2009 Priority Notice, and the proposal itself.  Therefore, the par-
adoxical result arises: If not hardrock mining, for which classes of facilities
must EPA promulgate financial assurance requirements pursuant to its duty
to do so?  Aside from being contrary to the separation of powers, a functional
repeal would be problematic because several other industries may necessitate
195 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
196 It is quite possible the public liability figures are underestimated: James Kuipers,
who conducted the comprehensive study of state hardrock bonding programs cited above,
see KUIPERS, supra note 36, estimated the range for public liability to be somewhere
between $701 million and $12.2 billion (though his analysis is now over fifteen years old).
See KUIPERS, supra note 111, at 2.
197 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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financial assurance requirements under this provision, as EPA has
suggested.198
Because the answers to the first two questions are, or should be, yes, it is
now necessary to explore the scope of the duty to establish financial assur-
ance requirements.  Before doing so, it is important to acknowledge the
potential that the above analysis is incorrect, and that the deference given to
EPA’s recent decision will make financial assurance for hardrock mining a
discretionary power.  However, as reflected by the decision itself, when the
presidency passes from one political party to the other, changes in adminis-
trative priorities are likely to follow.  Thus, if a future administration decides
to use section 108(b) of CERCLA, the following considerations will remain
relevant.
B. The Scope
The three most important issues relating to the scope of EPA’s authority
are (1) the means by which financial assurance amounts are determined, (2)
the range of acceptable instruments, and (3) the relationship of the require-
ments to existing state bonding programs.  First, section 108(b) provides lit-
tle guidance as to how to establish the financial assurance amount, thus
leaving EPA with significant discretion.  EPA may opt for a formulaic
approach, as it proposed, or a more traditional approach tied to a permit-
based regulatory program, which it considered.199  Once the amount is estab-
lished, section 108(b)(2) provides that the level of financial responsibility
“shall” be adjusted when necessary.200  Thus, EPA must review the amount,
but it has discretion as to how often it does so.
Second, EPA may vary the scope of the acceptable instruments.  To have
the most limited impact on industry, EPA could allow the use of self-bonding
for the entire assurance.  Self-bonding is explicitly contemplated, though not
required, by section 108(b)(2).  While operators would have to maintain an
adequate balance sheet, this would enable them to avoid paying premiums
for a third-party instrument and setting aside funds for reclamation;201 con-
sequently, it allows “a lower barrier to entry for operators who already face
significant upfront infrastructure spending.”202  However, self-bonding pro-
vides a less stable guarantee in the event of a bankruptcy, not to mention the
administrative difficulties associated with overseeing companies’ finances.203
Thus, EPA may find it prudent to limit or disallow self-bonding and opt for
the other instruments in section 108(b)(2): insurance, guarantees, surety
198 See Identification of Additional Classes of Facilities for Development of Financial
Responsibility Requirements Under CERCLA Section 108(b), 75 Fed. Reg. 816 (Jan. 6,
2010).
199 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3401.
200 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2) (2012).
201 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 91, at 14.
202 Jason Malone & Tim Winslow, Financial Assurance: Environmental Protection as a Cost
of Doing Business, 93 N.D. L. REV. 1, 17 (2018).
203 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 91, at 14.
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bonds, and letters of credit.204  The recent decision noted concerns regard-
ing the availability of these instruments,205 though the proposal suggested
that allowing a diversity of instruments would ensure greater third-party mar-
ket capacity to underwrite financial assurance requirements.206
Finally, and perhaps the most important consideration related to the
scope of EPA’s authority, is the extent to which it preempts state reclamation
bonding programs.  The preemptive effect does not actually constrain the
scope of EPA’s authority, but it is a highly relevant as to how EPA exercises its
authority.  For example, in its final decision, EPA viewed the preemptive
effect as an “obstacle” to developing and implementing financial assurance
requirements.207  The preemptive effect hinges on the interpretation of sec-
tion 114(d).  It is not clear that the interpretation advanced in the propo-
sal—that section 108(b) requirements would not preempt state bonding
programs whatsoever—is correct.  Admittedly, it is difficult to reconcile sec-
tion 114(d)208 with section 114(a), which provides, “[n]othing in this chap-
ter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing
any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazard-
ous substances within such State.”209  At a minimum, it seems clear that state
bonding requirements unrelated to hazardous wastes will survive any section
108(b) requirements.  But the fate of state bonding requirements related to
hazardous wastes is unclear.  This Note does not seek to resolve this statutory
issue but rather suggests that the scope of EPA’s section 108(b) requirements
will largely depend on the resolution of the issue: if state requirements are
preempted with respect to CERCLA liabilities, section 108(b) requirements
will need to be comprehensive; if, however, state requirements are not pre-
empted, EPA might opt for more modest requirements.
CONCLUSION
During the time EPA has neglected its duty under section 108(b), sev-
eral hardrock mining operators have abandoned mines following bankrupt-
cies, thereby leaving substantial bills for taxpayers to pick up in order to
cover necessary reclamation costs.  Moreover, there are ongoing risks of pub-
lic liability unaccounted for by existing state and federal financial assurance
requirements.  Public liability coupled with EPA’s failure to act prompted
several reports calling for action and a lawsuit that resulted in a consent
decree requiring EPA to propose regulations.  EPA demonstrated an intent
to establish such regulations when it published its priority notice in 2009 and
its proposed regulations in 2017.  However, its recent decision not to issue
204 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2).
205 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Final Decision, supra note 10, at 7586.
206 See EPA’s Financial Assurance Proposal, supra note 14, at 3399.
207 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
209 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
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financial assurance requirements reflects disagreement as to the import of
section 108(b).
This Note posits that section 108(b) places a duty on EPA to promulgate
financial assurance requirements, and this duty extends to hardrock mining.
EPA’s duty comes with significant discretion as to how it establishes financial
assurance amounts and which instruments it accepts.  When exercising this
discretion, EPA must be cognizant of the potential preemptive effect of sec-
tion 114(d), the nature and economic role of the industry, and the norma-
tive question underlying financial assurance requirements: What is an
acceptable level of risk of public liability?  This task is complex to say the
least, but one the prudent lawgiver of the twenty-first century must
accomplish.
